Mullet Maters

3.1 Definitions (In-context)

• Discover — a method of choice used to discover other humans (e.g. “swiping”)
• Match — a mutual indication of interest between two or more humans
• Chat — communication between two or more humans
• Meet — a gathering between humans, usually physical; generally considered a desirable terminal state
• Ruin — human-induced termination of an otherwise viable interaction, sometimes accidental
• Enshittification — the gradual degradation of a digital platform or service, typically driven by the pursuit of increasing profits for its owners or shareholders
• Unenshittification — the absence, prevention, or reversal of enshittification
• Trust Me, Bro — an informal assurance offered in lieu of independently verifiable evidence
• WTAF — “What The Actual Fuck”; an expression of simultaneous dissatisfaction and confusion
• $$$ — the forfeiture of legal tender
• Chitchat — communication between two or more humans of limited substance or consequence

3.2 Industry Standard Protocols (Non-comprehensive)

Numerous online dating protocols are currently in use across the dating app industry. None should be considered universally optimal, nor a substitute for offline dating, including the Mullet Maters protocol. Table 3.2.1 covers some of the most widely adopted protocols below in order to better contextualize how Mullet Maters operates.

Scroll horizontally to view the full table. ↔

 DISCOVER  ──→    MATCH   ──→   CHAT    ──→  MEET
     ↑              ↑             ↑
  PREMIUM        PREMIUM       PREMIUM
VISIBILITY       ACCESS        FEATURE
     $              $             $

 └──────────────── VEL ───────────────┘

          ┌───────────────────┐
HUMANS ───→        AI         ──→   MATCH ──→  $$$  ──→ MEET
          └───────────────────┘
                    │
              TRUST ME, BRO

                            ┌──→  $$$ ──→ WTAF
HUMAN ──→ PLATFORM PROMISE ─┤
                            └──→ WTAF

┌───────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                  HUMANS                   │
│ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ │
└───────────────────────────────────────────┘
    ↑         ↓         ↓         ↓
CHITCHAT ←  CHAT      CHAT      CHAT  ──→ MEET

          ┌───────────────────────┐
HUMANS ───→   HUMAN MATCHMAKER    ──→     MEET/DATE
          └───────────────────────┘
                      │
                     $$$

• The above dating app “protocols”, to our knowledge, have not been formalized in any meaningful way, nor recognized by any regulatory or governing body. They are merely used here for illustrative purposes, and may or may not contain bias.

3.3 The Mullet Maters Online Dating Protocol

Mullet Maters implements a swipe-based, unenshitified variant of the Discover, Match, Chat, Meet protocol (DMCM-U). Like all DMCM-derived implementations, Mullet Maters also fully supports the Discover, Match, Chat, Ruin, Repeat protocol extension (DMCRR). See Figure 3.3.1 for an enhanced visualization of the Mullet Maters online dating protocol.

• Please note “RUIN” may still occur during the “MEET” stage; however, such a transition falls outside the scope of the DMCRR protocol extension.

5.1 End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) — The Basics

End-to-end encryption (E2EE) keeps a conversation private between its endpoints. Messages are encrypted on the sender’s device (one “end”) before transmitting, and remain encrypted until reaching the intended recipient(s)’ device(s) (the other “end(s)”). Systems between these endpoints—including Mullet Maters infrastructure—do not possess the information required to reconstruct the message plaintext.

Analogously, E2EE can be thought of as sending a message inside a locked container. The sender locks the container before handing it off for delivery, and only the intended recipient(s) possess what is required to unlock it. Along the way, the container may pass through numerous third parties responsible for transporting, storing, or otherwise handling it; none need access to its contents to perform those functions.

Figures 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 serve to illustrate the fundamental difference between messaging services/platforms with E2EE, and those without E2EE.

5.2 An Overview of E2EE on Mullet Maters

• Mullet Maters uses a custom E2EE protocol based on the OpenPGP standard (RFC 9580) for end-to-end encryption of chat messages
• All chat messages are always end-to-end encrypted — there is not an optional E2EE mode, secret chat mode, or otherwise downgraded chat experience available on the platform
• All chat messages and conversations are encrypted at rest when stored locally and are persisted upon first discovery to provide the enhanced security properties of record pinning, with improved offline availability as an additional benefit
• Only message content (e.g. “hey cutie :)”) and information necessary to secure it are end-to-end encrypted on Mullet Maters; message metadata (user identifiers, timestamps, etc.) is not end-to-end encrypted and remains readable to the Mullet Maters messaging service
• For moderation purposes, Mullet Maters uses a technique known as message franking to authenticate message plaintext voluntarily disclosed by a recipient when filing a report — this allows Mullet Maters to verify the authenticity of a reported message without knowing its plaintext before it was voluntarily disclosed
• All push notification data not required for delivery or routing is also end-to-end encrypted on Mullet Maters, including application-level metadata (event types, user identifiers, etc.); this applies to all push notification events, not only chat messages

5.3 E2EE Endpoints

End-to-end encryption protects messages between endpoints; it does not protect an endpoint that has itself been compromised. If a device is compromised—such as when a device gets infected with malware or stolen—while message plaintext or the cryptographic material required to recover it is accessible, E2EE cannot prevent that information from being obtained.

Likewise, E2EE cannot prevent the participants in a conversation from sharing messages they have received. A sender or recipient may copy, capture, or otherwise disclose message plaintext, including when a recipient voluntarily discloses a message to Mullet Maters through the reporting process.

5.4 Conversation Security Codes

End-to-end encryption protects messages between cryptographic endpoints, but encryption alone cannot establish that an endpoint belongs to the person a user believes it does. If an incorrect or substituted identity key were presented for another user, messages could be encrypted securely to the wrong cryptographic endpoint.

Mullet Maters provides conversation security codes in-app to close this verification gap. A conversation security code is a human-verifiable fingerprint representing the cryptographic identities of everyone participating in a conversation and can be compared through a trusted channel outside Mullet Maters—or in person—to independently confirm that all participants observe the same code (see 5.5).

Conversation security codes must match exactly. If even a single character differs, the cryptographic identities represented by the codes are not identical and the conversation should not be considered secure until the mismatch has been resolved.

Figure 5.4.1 below shows an example of what a conversation security code looks like in the Mullet Maters app.

7A3F 91C2 0B84 D6E1
48AF 02C7 91BE 663A
A219 F40D 73C8 5E11
9B60 4AD2 C817 3F05

5.5 Best Practices — E2EE & Mullet Maters

• Security-code verification presents an unusual problem on a dating app: everyone basically starts as a stranger — comparing cryptographic fingerprints through an independently trusted channel is a longstanding practice in end-to-end encrypted messaging, which is why Mullet Maters provides security codes. Unlike traditional messengers, however, Mullet Maters generally introduces people who have no preexisting trusted channel through which to perform that comparison. Meaningful out-of-band verification may therefore be impractical until participants meet in person or otherwise establish an independently trusted means of identifying one another
• Do not move conversations off Mullet Maters solely to compare security codes — a second messaging service does not independently establish another participant’s identity when the contact information used to reach them was itself obtained through Mullet Maters
• Share meetup plans out-of-band with someone you trust before meeting another user in person; provide a trusted person who is not attending with relevant details including who you are meeting, when and where you expect to meet, and any other information appropriate to the circumstances; this is particularly important on Mullet Maters because end-to-end encryption prevents Mullet Maters from retaining a readable history of conversations from which meetup details could later be recovered in theory
• The Mullet Maters “Share My Date Plans” feature is provided as a convenience, not as a replacement for out-of-band sharing — meetup plans can be shared through Mullet Maters-generated links, but sharing the same information independently ensures that someone you trust retains the information outside Mullet Maters